This article analyses the reactions by political actors to the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Catalan Parliament. It is suggested that political framings of the ruling can be classified into the legalist, attitudinal and institutional academic models of judicial behaviour. As will be shown, these models have a normative dimension, with implications for the ideal of the Rule of Law. These implications are skilfully captured and exploited by political actors as part of a wider battle for the framing of the ruling. The Rule of Law thus becomes politicised as a result of the tension around the judicialisation of the so-called Catalan 'sovereignist process'.
The role of the Constitutional Court in contemporary decentralised Spain
After the death of the dictator Franco, the formerly repressed demands for selfgovernment of the so-called ´historic nationalities' -such as Catalonia or the Basque Country-flourished in Spain permitted Autonomous Communities to have an active role in the process of devolution from which they were benefiting. The result has been a deep decentralisation of the political structure of the State, to the point that some authors speak about a process of federalisation of Spain 4 .
The Constitutional Court has been considered of paramount importance in this process 5 .
According to Shapiro, one of the explanations for the blooming of constitutional review is precisely political decentralisation, as 'federalism required some institution to police its complex constitutional boundary arrangements' 6 . In Spain, the function of constitutional review is entrusted to an independent institution, a Constitutional Court inspired in the Kelsenian model that is currently dominant in continental Europe 7 .
Together with other functions, most notably the defence of the constitutional rights of citizens, the Constitutional Court ensures the respect by legislation of the constitutional mandates, including those that delimit the respective competences of State level organs 4 Robert Agranoff and Juan Antonio Ramos Gallarín, ´Toward Federal Democracy in Spain: An Examination of Intergovernmental Relations', in: 27 Publius (1997) This article aims to fill that gap. Its assumption is that theories of judicial decisionmaking are not only competing academic perspectives on judicial activity, but in less sophisticated versions, they are also used by political actors and utilised in political struggles over the interpretation of the law and of judicial decisions. Political actors have an interest in legitimising favourable judicial outcomes by framing them as the result of unbiased processes of decision-making. By using 'legalist' framings, all of the legitimising potential of the Rule of Law ideal is transferred to the judicial decision.
Conversely, unfavourable decisions are to be presented as the result of a politically biased court. This framing strategy delegitimises the ruling and is a form of retaliation against the court. It also appeals to the ideal of the Rule of Law, but only to suggest that the unfavourable decision does not meet its standards and is thus illegitimate. What I want to argue is that, from this perspective, legalistic framings of the rulings are political strategies as much as attitudinal and institutional framings. My hypothesis, therefore, is that the selection of framings can be explained by the distance between the actors' preferred judicial outcome and the actual decision of the court. To ensure comprehensiveness, instead of simply searching for key words in a digital search engine, I performed an exhaustive review of all articles published in the paper and digital editions of these newspapers during the analysed period and selected all those that referred to the ruling in one form or another. For the framing analysis in the penultimate section, I only included reported speeches of politicians and opinion articles written by them and excluded opinion articles written by other subjects or by the editorial teams. Parliamentary debates were also used: these were available for this period at the website of the Catalan Parlament de Catalunya. Although parliamentary debates at the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados and at the Senado were also sought, they did not cover the topic of this article during the analysed period.
The Political Scenario in Catalonia
The evolution of Catalan Politics in the years before the decision of the Constitutional Court had been marked by increasing political polarisation. The 2012 Catalan elections gave rise to a complex political landscape. The ruling CiU party lost some support compared to the previous elections, but it remained the most voted-for party.
Furthermore, the pro-referendum parties (CiU, ERC, ICV, and CUP) together obtained a large majority 25 . In view of the results, the two most voted-for parties, CiU and ERC, e. Europeanism. The foundational principles of the European Union will be promoted.
f. Legality. Every available legal frame will be used in order to exercise the right to decide.
g. Prominent role of the Catalan Parliament.
h. Participation. The Catalan institutions must require local and social actors to participate in the process.
As stated above, the final text of the Declaration was passed by the Catalan Parliament with the support of three parties: the centre-right CiU and the left-wing ERC and ICV.
Three parties voted against the Declaration: PSC, PP and Ciutadans. Finally, the three deputies of the seventh party in the Catalan chamber, the radical left CUP party, did not follow any party discipline: while one of the deputies backed the declaration, the two remaining deputies abstained. However, its two component parties placed slightly different emphases on the process:
while CDC was clearly in line with the idea of giving voice to Catalan citizens and driving Catalonia to independence, UDC insisted more on the need to agree upon the referendum with the Spanish State and, if possible, achieve a con-federal solution for
Catalonia. The left-wing ICV, although it supported the referendum, did not have a clear
political stance on what outcome they preferred in case such a referendum took place.
The socialists of PSC had in principle supported the view that Catalan citizens should be consulted about their future, but at a later stage, they opposed the holding of the referendum with the argument that it had not been agreed upon with the Spanish State.
Together with PSOE -the party to which it is federated-PSC defended an agreed consultation that intended a federalisation of the Spanish Constitution. Finally, PP -in power in the Spanish government-and Ciutadans defended that the referendum should not take place and advocated in favour of the current State of Autonomies and the status quo.
The Ruling by the Spanish Constitutional Court on the Declaration of Sovereignty
The Spanish Government considered the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Catalan neutral and apolitical application of the legal system to a dispute they must resolve.
Thus, to reconstruct a legalist narrative for this case, the reasoning of the Constitutional Court can be followed.
Before the Court issued the ruling, part of the discussion among legal scholars and political actors referred to the question of whether the Resolution of the Catalan Parliament had actual legal effects or was simply a political declaration, as the Constitutional Court was only allowed to make a decision on the merits in the first case.
In its ruling, the Court considers that the Resolution 5/X of the Catalan Parliament is a 'perfect or definitive act' in the sense of being a final declaration of the will of the Catalan Parliament issued in the exercise of the powers conferred to it by the legal system of the Autonomous Community. Furthermore, although the resolution was not deemed to have binding effects, it would nonetheless have legal effects because it attributes powers inherent to sovereignty to Catalan political actors and because it requires the carrying out of concrete actions to give effect to the 'right to decide'. This allowed the Court to consider the Resolution as a legitimate object of review.
Subsequently, the ruling goes on to assess the idea that the Catalan people is a sovereign subject. Such idea is, according to the Court, contrary to Arts. In substantive terms, this meant that the Court took an intricate approach: the 'right to decide', which had been invoked by actors supporting the Declaration, was not necessarily unconstitutional. However, the actual exercise of that right could not be carried out beyond the constitutional mandates, which, according to the Court, stated that only the Spanish people -and not the Catalan people-were sovereign, as was defended by the opponents of the Declaration. Implicitly, the Court seemed to suggest that a referendum about the status of Catalonia could only be constitutional after a constitutional amendment.
In the last part of the ruling, the 'fallo', the Court first declares unconstitutional the principle of Catalan sovereignty enshrined in the Declaration. Second, however, it declares constitutional 'the right to decide of the citizens of Catalonia' if interpreted according to the legal reasoning of the Court, and it rejects the petition in all other regards. In summary, as has been shown, the discourse of the Court in the ruling follows a legalist structure, with every decision being depicted as anchored in a neutral and apolitical interpretation of the constitutional framework.
An Attitudinal Reading
Unlike the former reading, an attitudinal reading would suggest that the final decision of the ruling was simply the result of the preferences of the magistrates 29 . In general, the Spanish media talks about 'conservative' and 'progressive' magistrates in the Constitutional Court, and it is assumed that each of these blocks is close to the preferences of the Spanish main parties: PP and PSOE. As was shown in Table 1 above, these two political parties were opposed to the option of independence, and their preferences regarding the decision of the Court pointed to the protection of the status quo. Only one magistrate, Encarnación Roca, was deemed to be ideologically close to the nationalist CiU, one of the parties that supported the Declaration of the Catalan Parliament and the possibility of a popular consult on the status of Catalonia. Table 2 shows the composition of the Court as it was described by the Spanish media 30 . As seen, 'boosted with a great interest the streamlining of the formalities to nominate the new magistrate' in order to recover the 7 against 5 majority 37 .
In this context, it might be more easily understood how the rules on decision-making within the institution -the internalist side of the model-operated in order to produce the final outcome. In principle, the magistrate in charge of making a draft resolution was Adela Asua, who was closer to the progressive minority. Her initial drafts, which considered the Declaration as lacking legal efficacy and, hence, as outside the scope of The final decision would be, from this perspective, the result of a compromise between the conservative and progressive sectors in the Court. The rules of the institution do not require consensus by all magistrates but allow dissenting opinions. However, according
to Spanish newspapers, 'The conservative magistrates had a safe seven votes majority, but they wanted to avoid at any cost -specially the President -that the Court was divided and ended up deciding on the sovereignist declaration by a margin of two 
The Framing by Political Actors
As has been shown, the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court was susceptible to interpretations from the perspective of any of the three dominant theories of judicial decision-making. In this section, I will show that framings by political actors actually correspond, in less sophisticated versions, with these three theories. Table 3 summarises the discourses of the political actors, including only those who could be considered unequivocally legalist, attitudinal or institutional. Discourses were considered legalist if they resorted to the idea of the Rule of Law, the need to respect judicial decisions and the legitimacy of the court. Speeches that used cognitive frames related to the ideology or partisanship of the magistrates were considered attitudinal.
Finally, discourses were considered institutional if they appealed to the relation of the court with other political actors or referred to its institutional biases. To justify the classification in Table 3 , all speeches are presented and qualitatively analysed in the following subsections.
As expected, supporters of the referendum were rather critical of the ruling and accused the Court of being politicised, either from institutionalist (i.e., politicisation of the institution, connections with other State organs) or attitudinal (most notably, hostile preferences of the magistrates) discourses. Opponents of the referendum tended instead to make legalist framings of the ruling, although in this case the message was more subtle and indirect: instead of explicitly saying that the Court had simply applied the law to the case, their speech focused on reclaiming respect for judicial decisions and for the Rule of Law. Thus, as theorised, the framings of the ruling were directly connected to the preferred outcomes of the political actors. Together with this pattern, however, a second one was detected, according to which all actors tried to emphasise those parts of the ruling that were closer to their political stance on the question of the referendum:
opponents of the referendum underlined that the ruling had declared Catalonia not to be a sovereign people and that a unilateral plebiscite was unconstitutional, while supporters of the referendum, after some hesitation, focused on the idea that at the end of the day, the ruling opened the door to a consultation if the constitutional framework was respected. Finally, it must be noted that most reactions to the ruling were articulated around political concepts. Neither supporters nor opponents of the ruling tried to use arguments of a doctrinal type, i.e., referring to concrete legal provisions and their interpretation to back or oppose the ruling of the Court. Instead, they preferred to resort to highly political framings based on notions such as that of the Rule of Law, the partisanship of magistrates or the politicisation of the Court. Joan Tardà (ERC) stated that Court was 'corrupted' 43 . Finally, the CUP's response seemed harsher than that of any other party. Its deputy Isabel Vallet considered that the Court was eminently political and that the proof of its politicisation was that it has analysed the issue faster than other ones that were much more important for the society, such the law on bankruptcy or the ongoing foreclosures. Furthermore, she did not accept 41 ACN/Barcelona. 2014. CiU no le da "ninguna credibilidad" a las resoluciones de un TC donde hay "agitadores de la catalanofobia". El Periódico (digital edition), 25 March.
42
Europa Press. 2014. ERC: "La hoja de ruta de la consultationa no debe moverse ni un milímetro". La Vanguardia (digital edition), 25 March the ruling as a 'valid' decision and considered that the exercise of sovereignty is not susceptible to being legally assessed 44 .
Statements by political actors continued during the days subsequent to the ruling.
Debates in the Catalan Parliament, registered in its official publication Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, show that a slight change could be detected in the reactions of pro-referendum actors. They seemed to have learned that they could exploit certain parts of the ruling in their favour, even if de-legitimising criticisms of the Court were still frequent. The Catalan President, Artur Mas (CiU/CDC), is a good example. In his speech to the Catalan Parliament, he recalled that, according to the Court, the 'right to decide' could be interpreted as constitutional, quoting a paragraph of the ruling.
However, his criticisms were still harsh. He disparaged the Spanish Constitutional Court for making a decision on a political declaration of a Parliament, which was an unprecedented move. He made a legalistic concession, saying that the duty of the Court was to enforce the Constitution. However, he then suggested that in assessing the Declaration of Sovereignty, it had given up its role as a referee at the service of the had often referred to the possibility of a con-federal solution, ICV had a federal tradition, and PSC opted for the federal approach after an agreement with PSOE.
Having said this, the differences between all these parties were clear: while UDC and ICV supported the referendum called by the Catalan President, PSC opposed it. This is not a minor difference, and it had a real impact on political framings; thus, separate analyses will be devoted to UDC and ICV on the one hand and to PSC on the other.
However, as I will show, these three parties exhibited a common pattern: because the judicial outcome was not far from their preferences, they tried to frame it as a call to dialogue and to intermediate solutions, which they regarded with sympathy.
The pro-referendum parties UDC and ICV will be analysed first. On the day of the ruling, the reactions of the ICV leaders were rather critical. As said above, PSC also opted for federal-type solutions for the status of Catalonia, but unlike ICV and UDC, it did not support the Declaration of Sovereignty and considered that any referendum should be preceded by an agreement with the Spanish Government.
Maurici Lucena, spokesperson of the PSC in the Catalan Parliament, said that the ruling showed that the only way to celebrate the consultation was through agreement between the Catalan and Spanish governments 55 . The leader of the PSC, Pere Navarro, made a subtly legalistic reading when he said that the ruling had confirmed the interpretation of his party that, in order to make a legal consultation, it was necessary to amend the Constitution first. This was followed by an invitation to the Catalan President 'to use the Anti-Referendum Actors: Demanding Respect for the Rule of Law
As expected, opponents of the referendum underlined the opposite elements in the ruling. Their discourse was constructed around two interrelated strategies: they focused on those aspects of the ruling that were closer to their political stance -that the Catalan people were not deemed to be sovereign and that the consultation was considered impossible under the current constitutional framework-and simultaneously tried to reaffirm the legitimacy of the Court.
The PP-led Spanish Government said after the ruling that the law was on their side and that the ruling should be respected. 
Conclusions
The Probably as a reaction, some of the supporters of the referendum asserted that the legitimacy of their claim to a vote is higher than that of the Spanish legal system: 'the time has come to blow off the Spanish laws', the leader of the ERC party recently said 66 . This clash between legality and legitimacy, in which the idea of the Rule of Law is at the core, continues to be one of the most prominent aspects of Catalan and Spanish political life.
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